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Abstract
Recent advances in the development of compact microprocessors have brought forth new
applications in the field of data acquisition and wireless communication. One of these
applications is a compact sensor mote that has the ability to perform both data acquisition
and transmission within a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN).

Wireless sensor

communication is susceptible to the same data security threats as traditional wireless
networks. In an environment where sensors are broadcasting battlefield intelligence or
patient biometrics, data confidentiality must be enforced utilizing some form of
encryption.
Unlike traditional wireless networks, where the communicating devices have
unrestricted access to power and memory, a wireless sensor has very limited resources.
A wireless sensor consists of a battery designed to last an extended amount of time,
therefore it is critical that the computation and transmission overhead involved in
enforcing data security be optimized to preserve battery life.
The research presented in this thesis details a nesC/TinyOS implementation of the
NTRUEncrypt PKCS executing on a Crossbow MICAz mote.

Algorithm details

regarding message encryption and decryption are analyzed along with optimization
techniques that improve execution time and reduce memory size.

A summary of

performance metrics including execution time, power consumption and code size relative
to the comparable ECIES-160 PKCS is also provided.

v

Table of Contents
Thesis Release Permission Form
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Abstract
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Tables
Glossary
Glossary
1 Introduction
1.1 Private Key Cryptography
1.2 Public Key Cryptography
1.3 Security on Resource Constrained Devices
1.4 Related Work
1.5 Thesis Objectives
1.6 Organization
2 Elliptic Curves
2.1 Elliptic Curve Groups over Real Numbers
2.2 Point Addition for Points with Different x-Coordinates
2.3 Point Addition for Points with the Same x-Coordinates
2.4 Point Doubling (F + F = 2F, Fy ≠ 0)
2.5 Point Doubling (F + F = 2F, Fy = 0)
2.6 Point Multiplication
2.7 Elliptic curves Groups Over Fp
2.8 Point Addition Point Doubling
3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
3.1 Key Generation
3.1.1 Private Key(s)
3.1.2 Public Key
3.2 Encryption
3.3 Decryption
4 NTRUEncrypt Implementation
4.1 Background
4.2 Modulo Arithmetic
4.2.1 Modulo of Negative Numbers
4.3 Key Generation
4.3.1 Private Key(s)
4.3.2 Almost Inverse Algorithm
4.3.3 Public Key
4.4 Encryption
4.5 Decryption
4.6 Decryption Failures
4.7 Why Decryption Works
5 NTRUEncrypt Optimizations
vi

ii
iii
iv
v
viii
ix
ix
x
x
1
1
1
4
5
5
6
6
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
13
13
14
14
14
15
15
16
18
19
20
22
23
28
30
32
34
36
38

5.1 Star Multiplication
5.2 Karatsuba
5.3 Karatsuba Multiplication
5.4 Recursive Karatsuba (KM)
5.5 KM Performance
5.6 Private Key Polynomial fp
6 Evaluation and Performance
6.1 Hardware
6.2 Software
6.3 Test Setup
6.4 ECIES-160 Results
6.5 NTRUEncrypt-251 Implementation and Results
6.6 NTRUEncyrpt-251 vs. ECIES-160
6.7 NTRUEncyrpt-107
6.8 Energy Consumption
6.8.1 Microprocessor Power Consumption
6.8.2 Transmit and Receive Power
6.9 Code Size
7 Conclusion and Future Work
8 Bibliography

vii

38
39
39
40
42
44
46
46
48
49
49
52
55
56
59
59
60
61
64
66

List of Figures
Figure 2.1: Degenerate Curve ............................................................................................. 7
Figure 2.2: Elliptic Curve Point Addition When F ≠ -G .................................................... 8
Figure 2.3: Elliptic Curve Point Addition when F = -F ..................................................... 9
Figure 2.4: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling when F + F = 2F, Fy ≠ 0............................... 10
Figure 2.5: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling when F + F = 2F, Fy = 0 .............................. 11
Figure 2.6: Elliptic curve Point Addition for Fp ............................................................... 13
Figure 4.1: Number line representing positive and negative modulo............................... 19
Figure 4.2: Flow chart from encrypted ciphertext e to plaintext c.................................... 37
Figure 5.1: KM Example .................................................................................................. 42
Figure 5.2: KM polynomial Count [] and Size (N) for each iteration for N=107............. 43
Figure 6.1:Crossbow MICAz............................................................................................ 47
Figure 6.2: Crossbow MIB520 Gateway .......................................................................... 47
Figure 6.3: Actual ECIES-160 Execution Times.............................................................. 50
Figure 6.4: Actual ECIES-160 Execution Times Including Private Key Generation....... 52
Figure 6.5: NTRUEncrypt-251 Average Exec Time for 10 Rounds with CutOff = 252.. 54
Figure 6.6: NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 Execution Times................................... 55
Figure 6.7: NTRUEncrypt-107 Average Exec Times for 10 Rounds with CutOff = 28 .. 56
Figure 6.8: NTRUEncrypt-107 Execution Times with Zero Check Enabled................... 57
Figure 6.9: NTRUEncrypt-107 Execution Times with Zero Check Disabled.................. 58
Figure 6.10: ECIES-160 Code Size .................................................................................. 62
Figure 6.11: NTRUEncrypt-251 Code Size...................................................................... 63

viii

List of Tables
Table 4.1: k = 1 Round of AIA ......................................................................................... 25
Table 4.2: k = 2 Round of AIA ......................................................................................... 25
Table 4.3: k = 3 Round of AIA ......................................................................................... 26
Table 4.4: k = 4 Round of AIA ......................................................................................... 26
Table 4.5: k = 5 Round of AIA ......................................................................................... 26
Table 4.6: Binary to trinary conversion ............................................................................ 31
Table 4.7: Trinary to binary conversion ........................................................................... 34
Table 5.1: KM execution time versus CutOff value ......................................................... 44
Table 6.1: MICAz (MPR2400CA) Hardware Specification............................................. 48
Table 6.2 Liu et al vs. my work timing results for ECIES-160 ........................................ 51
Table 6.3: NTRUEncrypt parameter selection based on security..................................... 52
Table 6.4: NTRUEncrypt-251 Execution Times .............................................................. 55
Table 6.5: Power Consumption for ECIES-160 and NTRUEncrypt-251......................... 59
Table 6.6: Public Key Size for NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160................................ 60
Table 6.7: Transmit and Receive Power Based on Cryptosystem .................................... 60
Table 6.8: NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 ROM and RAM Sizes............................ 64

ix

Glossary
ECC

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

ECDH

Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman

ECDSA

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

ECIES

Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme

PKCS

Public Key Crypto-System

WSN

Wireless Sensor Network.

x

1 Introduction
Security within a network, either wired or wireless, typically involves the use of
cryptography. Cryptography is the process that allows for secure communication over
insecure channels [1]. A channel is a transport mechanism that facilitates the exchange
of information from one location to another using a physical wire or through the air. In
order for two parties to communicate securely, they must utilize a mathematically
common element, know as a key, to transform and thereby disguise messages being
transmitted be each other. The transformation of an intelligible message, called plaintext,
into an unintelligible form, called ciphertext, is called encryption. The reverse process of
converting the ciphertext back into a usable plaintext form is known as decryption.
Whether the key is kept secret among the communicating parties, or a subset of the key is
publically shared, defines the type of cryptosystem.

1.1 Private Key Cryptography
A cryptosystem in which the key is ‘shared’ and kept private between the communicating
parties is known as a symmetric, or private key, cryptosystem. Since the key is used in
both the encryption and decryption process, it must remain private otherwise the security
between the two parties will be compromised. As long as a secure channel exists within
the private key cryptosystem, private keys can be easily updated on a regular cadence to
prevent an adversary from studying the cryptosystem and determining the private key [1].

1.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key, or asymmetric cryptosystems are an evolutionary improvement over its
private key counterpart. Introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [41], at the time when
computer networking was at its infancy, Diffie and Hellman realized a need to establish
secure communication over an insecure channel, i.e. a network connection.

Unlike

private key cryptosystem where the private key is shared between the communicating
parties, public key cryptosystems do not share a common key. A party interested in
establishing a secure conversation, obtains each others public keys, without the need of a
private channel. The distribution of public keys can be done publically, without the
1

means of a secure channel, thereby allowing anyone to communicate securely to the
owner of the public key.
Though public key cryptosystems (PKCS) allow for quick and easy setup, their
key size, number of bits, are typically larger than those of a private key cryptosystem of
equivalent security level [46]. The public key cryptosystem, RSA [3] whose name was
derived from the authors’ initials, has a 1024-bit public key version with an equivalent
symmetric security level of only 80-bits [47].
Since the PKCS keys are larger and more complex to create, the amount of
computation power required for encryption and decryption is significantly greater than
that of a private key cryptosystem.

Figure 1.1 provides a high level overview of the

process involved in sending an unsecure plaintext message from a sender, the conversion
into an encrypted ciphertext, to the final decryption back to plaintext form that a recipient
can understand. This is a one way function starting at the sender and ending at the
receiver, therefore in order for a message to return back to the sender, the sender would
have to provide their own public key to the receiver and the whole process would run in
reverse.

Sender

Receiver

Receiver’s Public Key

Receiver’s Private Key

Decryption
Algorithm

Encryption
Algorithm
Plain Text

Cipher Text

Figure 1.1: Public Key Encryption and Decryption
2

Plain Text

Advantages of Public Key Cryptosystems in Key Distribution
The small key size and low computational complexity of private key cryptosystems allow
for fast execution times and low memory usage, but the inherent design of the
cryptosystem does not facilitate updating the private key used between the two
communicating parties.
Key distribution schemes allow for the secure deployment, or replacement, of the
private keys being utilized in a cryptographic system. Secure distribution of these keys
between the interested parties typically falls into one of three schemes: Key Distribution
Center Scheme, Key Pre-distribution Scheme and Public Key Scheme [29].
The Key Distribution Center Scheme utilizes a central server in which each node
interested in communicating on the network must access in order to obtain a private key.
In a wireless environment, where nodes are placed in remote areas that rely on message
hopping, access to a central server is not an option.
The Key Pre-distribution Scheme involves embedding keys within each node
prior to deployment [29]. This can be a universal key or multiple keys stored within each
sensor. The universal key, though not requiring much memory space, would easily
compromise the security of the network if an adversary were to capture the node and
obtain the common network key. Having each node contain multiple keys, a unique key
pair per node, reduces the probably of an adversary determining the correct ‘active’ key,
however, storing multiple keys per node increases memory size. In a wireless sensor
network, such as a battle field, where node counts could be substantial, storing unique
keys for per node communication is impractical [18].
Lastly, the public key scheme eliminates the issues involved with the
aforementioned schemes [29]. Due to the asymmetric property of PKCS, sensor nodes
do not need to contain any pre-distributed keys.

The advantage of a public key

cryptosystem over a private key cryptosystem is there are no private transactions required
prior to establishing secure communication [3].

Not having to establish a private

transaction means wireless sensors can be deployed at will and secure communication
can be established immediately. If a sensor is compromised as a result of an adversary,
new public keys can be easily distributed.

3

1.3 Security on Resource Constrained Devices
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications range from sensors collecting battle field
intelligence, to the monitoring of patient vitals such as heart rate and blood pressure.
Transmission of confidential data, such as sensitive medical information must be
protected from fraudulent activities such as alterations to treatment procedures or drug
dosages [5].
Wireless devices within a WSN typically have limited resources including battery
life, memory size and processing power. Maximizing battery life is extremely important
in environments where sensors are deployed only once and never serviced again. Though
transmission and reception of information usually requires the most energy in a WSN
[34], the extra processing cycles imposed by an encryption scheme can actually consume
more power than communication [9].

Every effort should be directed towards

optimization of the cryptosystem code to reduce power consumption.
Data security in resource constrained devices, such as wireless sensors, has
traditionally been solved using private key cryptosystems such as MiniSec [6] and
TinySec [7]. These private-key based cryptosystems are popular due to their low energy
consumption and fast execution times, but sacrifice security. An alternative cryptosystem
that provides enhanced security at the expense of increased computational complexity is
the asymmetric, or public key, cryptosystem.
While PKCS appear to be superior in regards to network compromises from an
adversary, they do have some deficiencies. Several publications argue that a PKCS,
though secure, are not realistic for use in wireless nodes due to their excessive
computational overhead [29][30]. An excellent example is the famous RSA PKCS [3]. It
is extremely secure, but is not a viable option for resource constrained devices due to its
high computational requirements [19]. The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) standard
is an alternative PKCS well suited for resource constrained devices that offers the
equivalent security to RSA, but with faster execution times and reduced memory size.
ECC [11] is based on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, but on an elliptic
curve. Given two points P and Q, it’s believed computationally infeasible to find a
number k such that Q = kP, see [13].
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NTRUEncrypt is a relatively new PKCS that suggests faster execution times and
requires less memory, for an equivalent security level, than ECC and RSA [24].
Conceived in 1996, NTRUEncrypt is a latticed based PCKS that features short, easily
created keys with fast execution times and low memory requirements [2].

1.4 Related Work
Challa et al work comparing NTRUEncrypt to RSA clearly shows NTRUEncrypt to have
significant performance gains over RSA [16]. Investigation into research benchmarking
NTRUEncrypt, to the very comparable ECC cryptosystem, is close to non existent. The
closest example by Driessen et al [15], provides an excellent comparison between the
NTRUEncrypt based key signature algorithm, NTRUSign, and the comparable ECC
equivalent Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Driessen et al research
supported their statement of “NTRUSign is superior to the other signature schemes when
comparing signature generation and verification time” [15]. Much of the performance
gains of NTRUSign were from use of trinary polynomials and Karatsuba [40] variants to
obtain a 9x performance increase over ECDSA [15].
A different approach, by Buchmann et al [14], that enhances the performance of
NTRUEncrypt’s fundamental operation of polynomial multiplication, involves finding bit
patterns within polynomials [14]. By identifying repeating bit patterns, the number of
additions required to compute the product of two polynomials can be reduced, thereby
lowering execution time.

1.5 Thesis Objectives
This thesis focuses on the details involved in the software implementation of
NTRUEncrypt on a resource constrained device including the comparison of
NTRUEncrypt performance metrics relative to the equivalent ECC version referred to as
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). Since ECIES is an accepted
standard under IEEE 1363-2000 [42], much research detailing implementation
optimizations along with execution times on various hardware platforms has been
published [12][13][17]. Though the details of ECIES will not be discussed, an overview
of ECC will be provided for completeness. The intent of this thesis is to provide an in
5

depth understanding of the steps involved in the implementation of NTRUEncrypt and
how its performance relates to ECIES.
The rationale to compare NTRUEncrypt with ECIES was based on several
publications by Challa et al [16] and Wang et al [5] that showed ECC based PKCS to
have greater performance than that of RSA [3]. Since ECC based PKCS are very popular
in the resource constrained embedded microprocessor market, comparing ECIES to
NTRUEncrypt on a resource constrained device was chosen.

1.6 Organization
The remainder of this thesis provides an overview of elliptic curves in Section 2
including the theory involved in the ECIES PKCS. Section 3 introduces NTRUEncrypt
and provides a detailed explanation, including examples, of how to implement
NTRUEncrypt. Section 4 provides data obtained from an actual implementation of both
NTRUEncrypt and ECIES on a wireless sensor, including execution time, RAM and
ROM size, and power consumption.

Software implementation details, along with

Karatsuba optimization techniques used by other researchers, of NTRUEncrypt are
discussed. Section 5 concludes this thesis by providing a summary of findings along with
suggestions for future work.

2 Elliptic Curves
2.1 Elliptic Curve Groups over Real Numbers
An elliptic curve is a smooth graph that does not contain any self-intersecting points
along its curve. Elliptic curves can be used to define a group given the following form
with a, b, x and y all being real numbers [8].
y 2 = x 3 + ax + b

(1)

The shape of an elliptic curve is controlled by the value selection of variables a and b.
For an elliptic curve to be valid for use in cryptography, the curve must not contain any
repeated factors and therefore must satisfy the following equation.
6

4a 3 + 27b 2 ≠ 0

(2)

Over a number field, a cubic, i.e. a polynomial of degree three, can have at most three
roots, where a root is defined as a point where the curve crosses the x-axis. For real
numbers, the roots of a cubic fall into two categories, degenerate and non-degenerate. A
degenerate case occurs if any two roots of the cubic coincide with one another, such as
the case where the two curve cross at the x-y intersection as shown in Figure 2.1 below:

(y)

(x)

Figure 2.1: Degenerate Curve
The following examples cover several non-degenerate curve applications.

2.2 Point Addition for Points with Different x-Coordinates
The addition of two points on an elliptic curve can be represented both mathematically,
as well as, graphically. The addition of two points, F and G, for points with different xcoordinates, is performed by drawing a straight line through points F and G until the line
intersects the curve at a third point –H, because the slope of such line is finite. The next
step is to take the reflection of point –H across the x-axis to obtain H. The resultant H is
the summation of F and G, see [8].
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Given:
F = (xF + yF), G = (xG + yG)

(y)
-H

Find (Addition of F and G):
H=F+G
Solve:
( y − yG )
s= F
( x F − xG )

G
(x)

x H = s 2 − x F − xG

F

y H = s ( x F − xG ) − y F
H

Answer:
H = ( xH , yH )

Figure 2.2: Elliptic Curve Point Addition When F ≠ -G

2.3 Point Addition for Points with the Same x-Coordinates
In this case, the previous point addition technique is invalid. The drawing of a line
through these two points results in a vertical line intersecting only two points on the
elliptic curve, instead of three. In this case, the elliptic curve group defines a third,
infinity point O, with the two points having additive inverses, see [8].
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Given:
F = (xF + yF), G = -F = -(xF + yF)

(y)

Find (Addition of F and -F):
H = F + (-F)
-F

Answer:
H = F + (-F) = O

(x)
F

Figure 2.3: Elliptic Curve Point Addition when F = -F

2.4 Point Doubling (F + F = 2F, Fy ≠ 0)
Doubling of a point involves adding a point to itself. The process involves drawing a line
through point F, tangent to the elliptic curve. The line will intersect a second point, -H,
on the elliptic curve if Fy ≠ 0. The reflection of point -H across the x-axis results in the
product point H, see [8].
Note: If Fy = 0, then the result of doubling F is the infinity point O, see [8].
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Given:
F = (xF + yF)

(y)

Find (2F):
H = 2F = F + F

H

Solve:
2
(3 xF + a )
s=
(2 y F )
Note: a represents one of the domain
parameters for the elliptic curve.

F
(x)

-H

xH = s 2 − 2 xH
y H = − y F + s ( xF − xH )
Answer:
H = ( xH , y H )

Figure 2.4: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling when F + F = 2F, Fy ≠ 0

2.5 Point Doubling (F + F = 2F, Fy = 0)
When attempting to double a point where the y-coordinate = 0, i.e. Fy = 0, the tangent
line to the elliptic curve will never intersect a second point on the curve. The tangent line
to the elliptic curve is actually vertical and results in the product, 2F, equaling the infinity
point O, see [8]. In this example, there are three possible points for F where Fy = 0.
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Given:
F = (xF + yF)

(y)

Find (2F):
H = 2F = F + F
Answer:
H = 2F = O, since Fy = O

H1

H2

H3

(x)

Figure 2.5: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling when F + F = 2F, Fy = 0

2.6 Point Multiplication
Point multiplication on an elliptic curve utilizes a scalar parameter k multiplied by a point
F on the elliptic curve, such that kF = H. Using the previous techniques of point addition
and doubling, point multiplication is possible. The following example illustrates the
technique [8].
Given k = 17 and point F, find H = kF.
H = kF = 17F = 2(2(2(2F)))) + F

Note: If Fy = 0 for point F, the following substitutions are made in the above equation

based on the point doubling equation, Figure 2.5, when Fy = 0.
Given 2F = O, then 2F + F = 3F = F. Continuation of this pattern reveals:
H = kF = 4F = 3F + F = O, 5F = 4F + F = F,….etc
In summary, if scalar k is even, H = O, otherwise H = F.
11

2.7 Elliptic curves Groups Over Fp
Cryptographic use of elliptic curves requires a finite field Fp instead of real numbers.
Extending the definition of the elliptic curve from real numbers to a finite field of
integers restricts the field size to p values through the use of modulo arithmetic. For an
elliptic curve, E(Fp) all computations in Fp are reduced modulo p, therefore an elliptic
curve containing non negative integer variables a, b, x and y can be defined as follows
[32]:
y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b (mod p)

(3)

Just as with elliptic curves over real numbers must not contain repeated factors, elliptic
curves over a finite field Fp must also maintain this property.
4a 3 + 27b 2 (mod p) ≠ 0

(4)

Elliptic curves, Fp, consist of a finite number of points thereby making them suitable for
cryptosystems. In order to utilize a Fp for cryptography, equation (4) must be satisfied
for randomly selected values of a, b, and p.
The following illustrates this step given randomly chosen variables a = 4, b = 3
and p = 5:
y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b (mod p)
y 2 ≡ x 3 + 4 x + 3 (mod 5)
Selecting point (2, 4):
4 2 (mod 5) ≡ 2 3 + 5(2) + 3 (mod 5)

16(mod 5) ≡ 8 + 10 + 3 (mod 5)

1≡1
Since point (2, 4) satisfies the equation, it is a valid point on the elliptic curve F5 and can
be used for cryptography.
The graphical representation presented in the last section is not feasible for an
elliptic curve with a finite number of points. The point addition and doubling techniques
12

are the same except a reduction modulo p is performed [8]. There is a point addition and
point doubling algorithm described as follows.

2.8

Point Addition

Point Doubling

Given:
F = (xF + yF), G = (xG + yG)

Given:
F = (xF + yF)

Find (Addition of F and G):
H=F+G

Find (2F):
H = 2F = F + F

Solve:
( y − yG )
s= F
(mod p )
( x F − xG )

Solve:
2
(3 xF + a )
s=
(mod p )
(2 y F )
Note: a represents one of the domain
parameters for the elliptic curve.

x H = s 2 − x F − xG (mod p )

y H = s ( x F − xG ) − y F (mod p )

xH = s 2 − 2 xH (mod p )
y H = − y F + s ( xF − xH ) (mod p )

Answer:
H = ( xH , y H )

Answer:
H = ( xH , y H )

Figure 2.6: Elliptic curve Point Addition for Fp

3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was introduced by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in
1985 [33] and is an accepted standard by IEEE under 1363-2000 & 1363a-2004 with
security based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem [8]. ECC
utilizes a finite group composed of points (x, y) located on an elliptic curve with the
encryption and decryption process based on the aforementioned point addition and
multiplication.

3.1 Key Generation
ECC key generation starts by selecting a finite field elliptic curve E(Fp) based on
Equation (3). Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp, let G be a point that has a
13

prime order n within E(Fp). These values can be used to generate cyclic subgroup E(Fp),
see [33]:
{G} = {∞, G, 2G,…(n-1)G}

3.1.1 Private Key(s)
The private key is an integer k that is selected at random from the interval [1, n-1].

3.1.2 Public Key
The public key, Q, is the private key k, multiplied by a random point H selected from the
elliptic curve.
Q = kH

(5)

3.2 Encryption
Encryption in ECC starts with the desired plaintext message to send, m. The message, m,
is converted into a point, M, in the finite field Fp and is encrypted by adding it to a
randomly selected integer k multiplied by the recipient’s public key Q, such that:
E1 = M + kQ

(6)

In addition to E1, the sender also calculates E2 by multiplying the previously selected k
with the random point H, such that:
E2 = kH

(7)

The sender then transmits both point E1 and E2 to the recipient [33]. In order for the
recipient to decode the ciphertext points, the two communicating parties must agree on a
set of domain parameters, T, that are exchanged up front. The parameters contain a list
of 6 items that relate the ciphertext to the original plaintext. The domain parameters are:
T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)
14

Where:
p – Size of field F
a – First value defining curve
b – Second value defining curve
G – Initial base point on curve
n – Order of point G
h - Cofactor

3.3 Decryption
To recover the original message, m, the recipient first must find point M on the elliptic
curve given the following equation:
M = E1 – kQ

(8)

Utilizing the domain parameters, p, E, H and n, the following substitutions are performed
[33].
kQ = k(dG) = d(kG) = d(E2)

(9)

Substitution of variables from (9) into (8) results in the following decryption equation for
point M.
M = E1 – d(E2)

(10)

Since the domain parameters are public, the recipient can reconstruct the elliptic curve
and locate the original message, m, given point M.

4 NTRUEncrypt Implementation
NTRUEncrypt was implemented in nesC and timing data was collected for each step of
the cryptosystem including key generation, encryption and decryption execution times.
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NesC [28] is a variant of the C Programming Language that is optimized to run on
resource constrained devices.
Pseudo-code representing the actual nesC code developed in this thesis are
represented as ‘Algorithms’ throughout the rest of this thesis unless otherwise noted.

4.1 Background
NTRUEncrypt, also known as the NTRU encryption algorithm, is a new PKCS relative to
other cryptosystems and was just recently adopted into the IEEE P1363.1™/D12 [22]
draft standard for PKCS in February of 2009. NTRUEncrypt was proposed by Hoffstein,
Pipher and Silverman in 1996 and is based on ring theory [2]. Security of the
cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of finding extremely short vectors within a lattice. It
was developed in an effort to provide an efficient public key cryptosystem that required
less system resources such as memory and CPU processing power, while still maintaining
similar security to that of other PKCS.

While the exact translation for the acronym

NTRU is not exactly known, several rumored translations include “Number Theorists
aRe Us” [1] and “N-Th Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring”.
NTRUEncrypt is based on a ‘Ring of Truncated Polynomials’ represented by ring
R below:

R=

Z[ X ]
( X N − 1)

(11)

The polynomials within the ring, R, consist of all truncated polynomials of degree N-1
having integer coefficients [31].
N −1

a( X ) = ∑ ai X i ∈ R = a0 X 0 + a1 X 1 + a 2 X 2 + ...a N −1 X N −1

(12)

i =0

The NTRU algorithm involves the addition and convolution multiplication of
polynomials within R, see [31]. Addition of polynomials, denoted by the symbol ‘ ⊕ ’, is
performed as follows utilizing traditional polynomial addition.
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N −1

a( X ) ⊕ b( X ) = ∑ (ai X i + bi X i ) ∈ R

(13)

i =0

= (a 0 X + b0 X ) + (a1 X + b1 X ) + ...(a N −1 X
0

0

1

1

N −1

+ bN −1 X

N −1

)

Since the resultant of any polynomial manipulation must remain within R, convolution
multiplication of polynomials, or ‘star multiplication’, denoted by the symbol ‘ ⊗ ’, is
performed the traditional way with the exception that the exponents must never exceed N.
Constraining the polynomial to size N is accomplished by reducing and rotating
exponents (i mod N).

a( X ) ⊗ b( X ) =

N −1

∑ (a X
i

n=0
i + j ≡n mod N

i

* bi X i ) ∈ R = c0 X 0 + c1 X 1 + ...cN −2 X N −2 + cN −1 X N −1

(14)

Constraining the polynomials to size N has an added benefit when implementing NTRU
in software and/or hardware. Unlike traditional multiplication where two N sized
polynomials multiplied together could potentially expand to 2N -1 in size, star
multiplication limits the size to N, thereby requiring less memory.
The fundamentals of NTRUEncrypt are based on parameters N, p, and q. As
mentioned above, N represents the number of degrees of the polynomial ring R. The
parameters p and q represent the modulus values used throughout the encryption and
decryption process. Both of these modulus values must maintain the following properties
[2].
-

The gcd(p, q) = 1, i.e. p and q must be relatively prime

-

The value of q must be considerably larger than p

Utilizing this ring of polynomials and reducing modulo p and q, encryption and
decryption can be performed [2].
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4.2 Modulo Arithmetic
Modulo arithmetic is a fundamental reduction operation used in many steps of the
NTRUEncrypt algorithm. Modulo reduction, referred to as ‘mod’, is the remainder value
produced by the division of two numbers [44].
Given:
Find:

a = 23, b = 7
c = 23 mod 7

23
= 3 remainder 2
7
23 mod 7 = 2
The general expression for modulo is:
a mod b
The concept of congruence can be also defined using modulo:
a ≡ c(mod b)
With congruency, given a constant b, the value c remains the same regardless of the value
chosen for a. The following two values of 23 and 30 are considered congruent to each
other.
23 ≡ 2(mod 7)
30 ≡ 2(mod 7)
If a and b have no common factors between them, then it is possible to find an inverse for
a(mod b), such that [44]:
a * c ≡ 1 (mod b)
Find the inverse of 2(mod 7):
11 * 2 ≡ 1 (mod 7)
The inverse of 2(mod 7) = 11 since 11 * 2 = 22 ≡ 1 (mod 7). The Extended Euclidean
algorithm [22] may be used to find the inverse of any number [44].
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4.2.1 Modulo of Negative Numbers
Modulo is defined as the difference between the largest integer multiple of the divisor
that is less than the dividend. Modulo reduction of a positive number is straightforward:
23 mod 7 = 2
Modulo reduction of a negative number can be difficult to comprehend:
-23 mod 7 = 5
The confusion begins with the natural tendency to divide and transfer the ‘sign’ to the
quotient. For the example of -23 mod 7, the largest integer divisor less than the dividend
is -28, not -23. The number line in Figure 4.1 represents the graphical representation for
both -23 mod 7 and 23 mod 7.

-28 -23

-30

21 23

-20

-10

0

10

20

30
2 = 23 mod 7

5 = -23 mod 7

Figure 4.1: Number line representing positive and negative modulo
Understanding the concept of negative modulo is extremely important in the
implementation of NTRUEncrypt since the private key polynomials contain negative
coefficients. The incorrect usage of modulo reduction for negative numbers will result in
unexpected polynomial coefficients throughout the NTRUEncrypt algorithm.
The modulo operator ‘%’ in nesC, as well as other programming languages,
simply transfers the ‘sign’ value of the dividend to the quotient, thereby resulting in an
incorrect solution. As a result, a custom modulo function detailed in Algorithm 4.1,
written in nesC, was used to correct this issue.
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Algorithm 4.1: Mod(value, modValue)

Input: value – Input to apply modulo
modValue – Modulo value to apply
Output: Modulo reduced value
Init: retVal = value
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

If ( value = 0 )
Return 0
If ( retVal + modVal <= 0 OR retVal – modVal >= 0)
retVal = value % modVal
If ( retVal < 0 )
retVal = retVal + modval
Return retVal

Minor optimizations to prevent the modulo ‘%’ operation from occurring on values equal
to zero or less than the ‘modVal’ where added in steps 1 and 3 of Algorithm 4.2.1.

4.3 Key Generation
Key generation in NTRU, just like all asymmetric cryptosystems, creates a private and
public key pair. Generation of the private and public keys in NTRU begins with the
selection of two polynomials f and g within ring R with coefficients being small relative
to the large modulus q. Selection of the two polynomials f and g are constrained to the
following criteria:
-

Polynomial f must be invertible modulus of both p and q. More
specifically [2]:
f q ⊗ f ≡ 1 (mod q )
f p ⊗ f ≡ 1 (mod p )

-

(15)

Polynomial f must contain df number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’, df -1
number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ and the remaining N-2df -1
coefficients equal to ‘0’.
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-

Polynomial g must contain dg number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’, dg
number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ and the remaining N-2dg coefficients
equal to ‘0’.

-

To ensure security, generation of both polynomials f and g, need to be
random generated by means of a Random Number Generator (RNG) or
Index Generation Function (IGF) detailed in [22].

Note: The reason df contains an unequal number of ‘+1’ and ‘-1’, is due to the constraint
of f to be invertible, since a polynomial f(1) = 0 can never be inverted. Polynomial g does
not need to be invertible and therefore has an equal number of ‘+1’s to ‘-1’s [2].
Creation of the random polynomials used throughout the NTRUEncrypt PCKS
must be generated in an unbiased manner to prevent an adversary from predicting future
sequences. Section 9.2.1 of the P1363.1 draft standard details the requirements for
generating random polynomials using either an index generation function (IGF) or a
random number generator capable of producing unbiased outputs. For the purpose of this
thesis, Algorithm 4.2 was written based on a random number generator. Since the
MICAz mote contains a rolling counter that is set to zero upon reset, generating a truly
random number given a constant seed was not feasible, though it was very useful for
producing predicable outputs for debugging purposes. Implementation on a device that
maintains time across resets would resolve this issue.
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Algorithm 4.2: GenerateRandomPolynomial(a(x), n, num_ones, num_neg_ones)

Input: n – Nth degree size of polynomial
num_ones – Number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’
num_neg_ones – Number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’
Output: a(x) = Polynomial with random coefficients equal to -1, 0, or +1
Init: pos = 0
1: While ( num_ones OR num_neg_ones )
{
2:
rVal = RandomNumberGenerator
3:
pos = rVal % n
4:
if (num_ones AND a(pos) = 0)
{
5:
a(pos) = 1;
6:
num_ones = num_ones - 1
}
7:
8:
9:

rVal = RandomNumberGenerator
pos = rVal % n
if (num_neg_ones AND a(pos) = 0)
{
a(pos) = -1
num_neg_ones = num_neg_ones - 1
}

10:
11:
}

Since the only requirement to generate a random polynomial is an input count for the
number of ‘+1’ and ‘-1’, Algorithm 4.2 loops through an n sized polynomial, inserting
num_ones count of ‘+1’ or num_neg_ones count of ‘-1’ at random positions.

4.3.1 Private Key(s)
NTRUEncrypt requires the generation and storage of two private keys, f and fp. The
generation of the private key polynomial f utilizes Algorithm 4.2 with df number of ‘+1’
and (df -1) number of ‘-1’.
The second private polynomial key, fp, is the inverse calculation of f modulo p (f
mod p). Calculation of this inverse, in the ring of truncated polynomials R, is performed
using either the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) [22] or the Almost Inverse
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Algorithm (AIA) [19]. Wilhelm’s investigation into the performance of both algorithms
suggests the AIA to have better performance and therefore was utilized in this thesis [23].

4.3.2 Almost Inverse Algorithm
By definition, a polynomial b is invertible, modulo p, if the resultant inverted polynomial
B maintains the following property [31].
b ⊗ B = 1 (mod p ) (mod x N − 1)

(16)

The work in presented by Silverman et al [20] presents two AIA implementations, one
for modulo p = 2 and another for modulo p = 3. The combined AIA, Algorithm 4.3, was
written to support both modulo reductions thereby reducing code space. The specific
changes required to add p = 2 support to the base p = 3 algorithm are shown as bolded
steps throughout Algorithm 4.3.
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Algorithm 4.3: AIA(a(x), b(x), n, c)

Input: a(x) – Polynomial to invert
n – Nth degree size of polynomial
c – Modulo value to apply to coefficients
Output: b(x) ≡ a(x)-1 – Inverse polynomial of a(x) in (Z/cZ)[x] / xn – 1; NoInverse; or
ERROR
Init: k = 0, b(x) = 1, c(x) = 0, f(x) = a(x), g(x) = xn – 1
Error Check: If (c != 2 OR c != 3)
Return ERROR
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6a:
6b:
7a:
7b:
8:
9:
10:
10a:
11:
12:

13:
14:

Loop:
{
While ( f(0) = 0 AND NumDegrees( f(x) != 0 ) )
{
f ( x)
f(x) =
x
c(x) = c(x) ⊗ x
k=k+1
}
If ( NumDegrees( f(x) ) = 0 )
{
If ( f(x) = 1 OR ( f(x) = -1 AND c = 3 ) )
Return f(0)x(n – k) ⊗ b(x) (mod xn-1)
Else
Return NoInverse;
}
If ( NumDegrees( f(x) ) < NumDegrees( g(x) ) )
{
Swap f(x) & g(x)
Swap b(x) & c(x)
}
If ( c = 3 AND ( f(0) = g(0) ) )
{
f(x) = f(x) - g(x) (mod c)
b(x) = b(x) - c(x) (mod c)
}
ELSE
{
f(x) = f(x) + g(x) (mod c)
b(x) = b(x) + c(x) (mod c)
}
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To demonstrate the property of inversion, an example detailing the process involved in
finding the inverse of polynomial b using the AIA, Algorithm 4.3, is shown.
Given: N = 5, p = 3, b = 1 + x2 – x4
Find: B = b-1
Tables 4.1-4.5, illustrate the number of ‘rounds’ required to find the inverse of b = 1 + x2
– x4. A ‘round’ is characterized by the variable k and is incremented whenever the
conditional f(0) = 0 is satisfied for polynomial f(x) (Step 2 of Algorithm 4.3). Each
column is labeled with the variable name referenced in the AIA Algorithm 4.3, with the
column labeled ‘Step’ corresponding to the particular operation step in the algorithm.
The first entry in Table 4.1 is the initial setup as shown in the ‘Init’ section of Algorithm
4.3.

k

b(x)

c(x)

f(x)

g(x)

0

1

0

1 + x2 - x4

-1 + x5

-1 + x5

1 + x2 - x4

0

1

13
14

x -x3 + x4

3
4
5

x
1
x
x -x3 + x4
1 + x2 - x4
Table 4.1: k = 1 Round of AIA

1

1

k

b(x)

c(x)

f(x)

g(x)

1

1

x

x -x3 + x4

1 + x2 - x4

1 - x2 + x3
2

x

Step

3
4
5

2
1

9
10

x2 -x4 + x5
1

2

Step

x2
1 - x2 + x3
1 + x2 - x4
Table 4.2: k = 2 Round of AIA
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k

b(x)

c(x)

f(x)

g(x)

2

1

x2

1 - x2 + x3

1 + x2 - x4

1 + x2 - x4

1 - x2 + x3

x2

Step

1

10
2

3

4

2

3

2x - x - x
-1 + x

11

2

12
2x - x - x

3
4
5

x
3
3

-1 + x2
x
2x - x2 - x3
1 - x2 + x3
Table 4.3: k = 3 Round of AIA

k

b(x)

c(x)

f(x)

g(x)

3

-1 + x2

x

2x - x2 - x3

1 - x2 + x3

2 - x - x2
x

4
5

4
4

-1 + x2

x2
2 - x - x2
Table 4.4: k = 4 Round of AIA

k

b(x)

c(x)

f(x)

g(x)

4

-1 + x2

x2

2 - x - x2

1 - x2 + x3

1 - x2 + x3

2 - x - x2

2

x

-1 + x

1 - x2 + x3

2

Step
9
10

2

3

3 - x -2x + x
2

-1 + X

13
14

-1 - 2x + x2

3

1 - 3x

4
5
13

-x + x3
5
-1 -x + 2x2 + x3
-1 -x + 2x2 + x3

Step
3

2

5

9

14
-x + x3
2 - x - x2
1
Table 4.5: k = 5 Round of AIA
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The effects of modulo reduction throughout the AIA can be observed in Step 13 of Table
4.5.

After the ‘Addition’ Step 13, the coefficient 3 was reduced to zero thereby

decreasing the polynomial by one degree.
Algorithm 4.3 continues to increment variable k until the number of degrees of
f(x) = 0 (Step 6a). Step 6b is evaluated next and is responsible for determining whether
or not the polynomial is actually invertible. If f(x) != ± 1, Algorithm 4.3 is aborted and
returns a value indicating no inverse exists (Step 7b). If an inverse is found, i.e. f(x) = ±
1, Step 7a is executed to reveal the inverted polynomial B as follows:
B = f (0) x ( n − k ) ⊗ b( x) (mod x n − 1) (Step 7a of Algorithm 4.3)
B = (1) x ( 5−5) ⊗ (−1 − x + 2 x 2 + x 3 ) (mod x 5 − 1)
B = (1)(1) ⊗ (−1 − x + 2 x 2 + x 3 ) (mod x 5 − 1)

B = −1 − x + 2 x 2 + x 3

(Inverse polynomial)

As a final check for inversion, Equation (16) is used to verify polynomial B is the inverse
polynomial of b.
b ⊗ B = 1 (mod p ) (mod x N − 1)
(1 + x 2 − x 4 ) ⊗ (−1 − x + 2 x 2 + x 3 ) = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)
Using Equation (14) the convolution of polynomials within ring R is computed.
(−1 − x + 2 x 2 + x 3 − x 2 − x 3 + 2 x 4 + x 5 + x 4 + x 5 − 2 x 6 − x 7 ) = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)

− 1 − x + x 2 + 3x 4 + 2 x 5 − 2 x 6 − x 7 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)

To keep the polynomial constrained to ring R, exponents ≥ N = 5, are rotated.

− 1 − x + x 2 + 3x 4 + 2 x 5−5 − 2 x 6−5 − x 7 −5 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)
− 1 − x + x 2 + 3x 4 + 2 x 0 − 2 x 1 − x 2 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)
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− 1 − x + x 2 + 3x 4 + 2 − 2 x − x 2 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)
1 − 3x + 3x 4 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)
A final modulo reduction of p = 3 proves B = b-1
1 – 3x + 3x4 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x5 – 1)

1 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x 5 − 1)

Therefore:
B = b-1

( −1 − x + 2 x 2 + x 3 ) = (1 + x 2 − x 4 ) −1

4.3.3 Public Key
The NTRU public key calculation requires computation of another inverse polynomial fq.
The calculation is very similar to the private key calculation of fp, with the only
difference being the inverse calculation uses the larger modulo value q. Since q must be
much larger than p, using Algorithm 4.3 exclusively to find the inverse fq is not possible
due to its modulo constraint of either p = 2 or p = 3. Closer examination of the large
value q used in NTRUEncrypt, reveals that it is always a number base log2.

This

property of q derives a second version, Algorithm 4.4, of the AIA [15] that builds upon
the original AIA Algorithm 4.3.
To illustrate how fq is calculated, a value of q = 32 is chosen. The value 32 can be
represented as a multiple of base 2 numbers such that:
32 = 2(2)(2)(2)(2) = 25
Since the number 32 is equivalent to log2(32) = 5, Algorithm 4.3 is utilized in the first
step of calculating fq by calculating polynomial f module p = 2, f2. Following the exact
same steps as the example in Tables 4.1-4.5, except with a modulo value of p = 2 instead
of p = 3, f2 is found. Using the resultant f2 inverse polynomial and log2(32) calls to
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Algorithm 4.3, f32 is calculated using Algorithm 4.4. Closer examination of Algorithm
4.4, step 3, shows the original f2, represented as a(x), being convolution multiplied by
itself log2(32) times to ultimately calculated f32.

Algorithm 4.4: AIA_Q(a(x), b(x), n, c, q)
Input: a(x) – Polynomial to invert
n – Nth degree size of polynomial
c – Modulo value to apply to coefficients
q – Modulo value base 2
Output: b(x) ≡ a(x)-1 – Inverse polynomial of a(x) (mod c)
Init: q = 2
1:
While ( q < c )
{
2:
q = q*2
3:
b(x) = b(x) ⊗ (2 – a(x) ⊗ b(x)) (mod q)
}

Since not all polynomials will have an inverse, a new random small polynomial f will
need to be chosen and the inverse calculations, fp and fq, performed again until successful.
Generating and testing for inversion is a time consuming process especially if an inverse
is not found and the process needs to be repeated. An optimization that will be discussed
in the next section eliminates the need to calculate the inverse polynomial fp, thereby
reducing key generation time and the storage space required for fp.
Using polynomial g and inverse polynomial fq from above, calculation of the
public key, h, is found:

h = pf q ⊗ g (mod q)
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(17)

Algorithm 4.5: CalcPublicKey(fq(x), g(x), h(x), p, q, n)
Input: fq(x) – Secret polynomial key fq
g(x) – Secret polynomial g
p - NTRUEncrypt ‘p’ parameter
q – NTRUEncrypt ‘q’ parameter
n – Degree size of polynomial
Output: h(x) – Public key polynomial h = pf q ⊗ g (mod q )
1: h( x) = f q ( x) ⊗ g ( x) (mod q)
2: For (i = 0 to n)
{
3:
h(i ) = (h(i ) * p) (mod q )
}

The first operation to compute the public key, h(x), is to perform the star multiplication of
fq(x) ⊗ g(x) as shown in Step 1 of Algorithm 4.5 using Equation (14). Step 2 iterates
through each position of h(x), multiplying by p modulo reduction q as shown in Step 3.

4.4 Encryption
The encryption process converts a plaintext message m into a suitable ciphertext e that is
broadcast to the recipient. Encrypting a message involves translating the binary plaintext
message m into a polynomial message construct M with coefficients ranging from
−

( p − 1)
( p − 1)
to
using Table 4.6:
2
2
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Input: Plaintext message m binary bit

Output: Message construct M trinary

pattern

pattern

{0,0,0}

{0,0}

{0,0,1}

{0,1}

{0,1,0}

{0,-1}

{0,1,1}

{1,0}

{1,0,0}

{1,1}

{1,0,1}

{1,-1}

{1,1,0}

{-1,0}

{1,1,1}

{-1,1}

Table 4.6: Binary to trinary conversion

The transformation from binary to trinary increases the message density thereby allowing
a larger binary plaintext message m to be stored in message construct M at a 3-to-2 ratio.
In order to provide plaintext awareness [2], a blinding polynomial r is generated
with the same criteria as g per the following requirements:
-

Polynomial r must contain dr number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’, dr
number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ and the remaining N-2dr coefficients
equal to ‘0’.

-

To ensure security, generation of polynomial r needs to be random
generated by means of a Random Number Generator (RNG) or Index
Generation Function (IGF) detailed in [22].

Once a valid blinding polynomial r is selected, it is multiplied with the public key h. The
final step is to add message m mod q to the product of r ⊗ h to produce the encrypted
ciphertext message e.

e = r ⊗ h + m (mod q )
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(18)

Algorithm 4.6 was written to perform encryption which performs one polynomial star
multiplication and a polynomial addition.

Algorithm 4.6: Encrypt(r(x), h(x), m(x), e(x) p, q, n)

Input: r(x) – Blinding polynomial key r
h(x) – Public key polynomial h
m(x) – Message polynomial to encrypt
p - NTRUEncrypt ‘p’ parameter
q – NTRUEncrypt ‘q’ parameter
n – Degree size of polynomial
Output: e(x) – Ciphertext polynomial e = r ⊗ h + m (mod q)

1: e( x) = r ( x) ⊗ h( x) (mod q)
2: e( x) = e( x) + m (mod q)

4.5 Decryption
Decryption reverses the encryption process to obtain the original message m. The first
step in the decryption process is to obtain the intermediate polynomial a, from the
ciphertext e, using the private polynomial keys fp and f [2].
a = f ⊗ e (mod q)

(19)

To ensure a high probability of decryption success, the coefficients of polynomial a must
be adjusted so that all coefficients range from −

q
q
instead of 0 to q. Details
to
2
2

regarding why this step is required is discussed in the next section under Decryption
Failures.
Once the coefficients are ‘balanced’, polynomial a is star multiplied by the
inverse private key polynomial fp and reduced modulo p.

b = f p ⊗ a (mod p)
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(20)

Next, the original message construct M is derived by an additional module p reduction.
M = b (mod p)

(21)

A subtle step, that is not very well documented, is needed to correctly recover message
construct M. Various coefficients throughout the algorithm are negative and therefore
there exist instances where the multiplication of two negatives coefficients or modulo
reduction of a negative coefficient results in a positive coefficient. Since the decrypted
message construct M must maintain a trinary form, its coefficient need to be ‘balanced’
around zero the same way polynomial a was.

Algorithm 4.7 was written to rotate a

polynomial into a trinary form.

Algorithm 4.7: ConvertToTrinary(a(x), p, n)

Input:

a(x) – Polynomial to convert
p - NTRUEncrypt ‘p’ parameter
n – Degree size of polynomial

Output: a(x) – Polynomial with trinary coefficients (-1, 0, 1)

Init: maxCoef = 2
1: for ( i = 0 to n )
2: {
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8: }

a(i) = Mod( a(i), p )
if ( a(i) >= maxCoef )
a(i) = a(i) – p
if ( a(i) <= ( -1 * maxCoef )
a(i) = a(i) + p

The final step in the decryption process is to convert the message construct M from a
trinary form back to the original binary plaintext message m using Table 4.7.
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Input: Message construct M trinary

Output: Plaintext message m binary bit

pattern

pattern

{0,0}

{0,0,0}

{0,1}

{0,0,1}

{0,-1}

{0,1,0}

{1,0}

{0,1,1}

{1,1}

{1,0,0}

{1,-1}

{1,0,1}

{-1,0}

{1,1,0}

{-1,1}

{1,1,1}
Table 4.7: Trinary to binary conversion

4.6 Decryption Failures
A decryption failure is when the plaintext message output of the decryption step does not
match the original input message. NTRUEncrypt is unique to other PCKS in that, with
standard parameters, ciphertext can fail to decrypt [48].
Given a polynomial of the form:
a( X ) = a 0 X 0 + a1 X 1 + a 2 X 2 + ...a N −1 X N −1 (mod q)
The minimum and maximum coefficients are defined as:
Min(a( X )) = min{a 0 , a1 ,..., a N −1 } ,

Max(a( X )) = max{a 0 , a1 ,..., a N −1 }

The width of a polynomial is the polynomial’s range:

Width(a( X )) = Max(a( X )) − Min(a( X )
To understand decryption failures, Equation 19 utilizes the following substitutions:

a = f ⊗ e (mod q)
Substitution for: e = r ⊗ h + m (mod q )

a = f ⊗ r ⊗ h + f ⊗ m (mod q)
34

Substitution for: h = pf q ⊗ g (mod q)
a = f ⊗ r ⊗ pf q ⊗ g + f ⊗ m (mod q )
Reduce: f ⊗ f q ≡ 1 (mod q )
a = r ⊗ p ⊗ g + f ⊗ m (mod q)
Since the coefficients of r, g, f and m are small, relative to q, their products will have a
small Width [50]. The objective is to find a modulo q interval that results in a successful
decryption, such that:
a(1) = r (1) ⊗ p(1) ⊗ g (1) + f (1) ⊗ m(1) (mod q)

If an incorrect modulo q interval is chosen, a decryption failure will occur since the
modulo q is incorrectly ‘zeroing’ out the coefficients of the polynomial. A successful
decryption occurs when the degree-one-or-higher terms of the inverse polynomial fp
cancel out, instead of the module q ‘zeroing’ out the terms.
A ‘gap’ decryption failure occurs when Width ≥ q, while a ‘wrap’ decryption
failure occurs if Width < q. With either failure, the resulting message m will be incorrect
by some multiple of q mod p [50]. The probability of a decryption failure can be
significantly reduced if the modulo q interval is adjusted such that the polynomial
coefficients are centered on zero and range from −

q
q
to instead of 0 to q. Algorithm
2
2

4.8 was written to ‘balance’ a polynomial by forcing all coefficients outside into the
range of −

q
q
to .
2
2
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Algorithm 4.8: BalancePoly(f(x), n, q)

Input: f(x) – Polynomial to balance
n – Degree size of polynomial
q – NTRUEncrypt ‘q’ parameter
Output: f(x) – Balance polynomial around

q
2

q
2
For (i = 0 to n)
{
If( f(i) > maxCoef )
f(i) = f(i) – q
If( f(i) < -maxCoef )
f(i) = f(i) + q
}

Init: maxCoef =
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

4.7 Why Decryption Works
For a cryptosystem to be useful, it must consistently be able to reproduce the original
plaintext message, from ciphertext, without any errors.

The steps involved in the

encryption and decryption process constrain the various polynomials to modulo p or
module q space. The encryption process combines several small modulo p constrained
polynomials together to form a larger modulo q constrained polynomial [37]. Since the
initial polynomials are constrained to a small modulo p, modulo reduction by q has no
affect on the polynomial coefficients. However, the steps involved in decryption start
with a polynomial constrained to the large modulo q space and work backwards reducing
the polynomials to the smaller modulo p space.
Starting from the encrypted ciphertext e and working backwards, Figure 4.1
illustrates the necessary variable substitutions to obtain the original plaintext c.
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a = f ⊗ e (mod q )
Equation (19)

h = pf q ⊗ g (mod q )
Equation (17)

e = r ⊗ h + m (mod q )
Equation (18)

a = pf q ⊗ r ⊗ f + m (mod q )
f q ⊗ f ≡ 1 (mod q )
c = f p ⊗ a (mod p )

[Substitution 1]

Equation (15)

Reduce (mod q)

Equation (20)

a = p⊗r +m

[Substitution 2]

c = f p p ⊗ r (mod p ) + m

[Substitution 3]
Reduce (mod p)

c = m (mod p )
Figure 4.2: Flow chart from encrypted ciphertext e to plaintext c

Starting with the original ciphertext equation (18), substitutions for variables e and h
using Equations (19) and (17) respectively results in an expanded definition of variable a
[Substitution 1] in Figure 4.2. The multiplicative inverse identity of Equation (15) and
the substitution of the plaintext definition of Equation (20) reduces the definition of
variable a to three variables p, r and m [Substitution 2]. The modulo q reduction of this
step does not affect any coefficients as long as the rules pertaining to q being large
relative to p are enforced. The final [Substitution 3], performs a modulo reduction p
which cancels out all terms except for the desired plaintext message m.
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5 NTRUEncrypt Optimizations
The core mathematics involved in almost every step of the NTRU algorithm involves
some form of polynomial multiplication. Techniques that reduce the execution time
required for polynomial multiplication directly improves the efficiency of NTRU.

5.1 Star Multiplication
Recall standard star multiplication of two polynomials, a(x) and b(x), contained in ring R
and both being N-degrees in size, is performed utilizing aforementioned Equation (14).
The pseudo-code version used throughout the NTRUEncrypt algorithm is detailed in
Algorithm 5.1.

Algorithm 5.1: Star_Multiply(a(x), b(x), c(x), n, d, m)

Input: a(x) – First polynomial
b(x) – Second polynomial
n – Size of polynomials a(x) and b(x)
d – Size of output polynomial h(x)
m – Modulo value to apply to coefficients
Output: c(x) = a(x) ⊗ b(x) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
Init: c(x) = 0, val = 0, exp = 0, i = 0, j = 0
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

For ( i = 0 to n )
{
If ( a(i) != 0 )
{
For ( j = 0 to n )
{
If ( b(j) != 0 )
{
exp = (i + j) (mod d)
val = c[exp] + a(i)b(i)
c[exp] = Mod(val, m)
}
}
}
}
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The convolution of two polynomials using traditional multiplication in code utilizes two
nested loops as seen in Steps 1 and 3 of Algorithm 5.1. Step 5 calculates and stores the
rotation amount, exp, of the exponents within ring R.

Steps 6 and 7 perform the

multiplication of the input polynomials, reduction modulo m, and adds the resulting
product to the correct polynomial coefficient. One very simple optimization to Algorithm
5.1 is shown in Steps 2 and 4. These two ‘If’ checks prevent any further execution of the
polynomial multiplication in Steps 5-7 if the coefficient of any polynomial equals zero.
Though this optimization has no affect on non-zero coefficients, ‘Zero Check’ reduces
the execution time required for generating the NTRUEncrypt private key polynomials
since approximately 1/3 of the secret polynomial coefficients for f, g and r are chosen to
equal zero per Section 4.3. Algorithm 5.1 requires very little RAM to execute, but has a
growth rate of O(n2)

5.2 Karatsuba
The Karatsuba Algorithm (KA) was introduced in 1963 by Anatolii Alexeevitch
Karatsuba [40] as a technique to improve the time required to multiply two polynomials.
The technique reduces the number of coefficient multiplications involved in standard
multiplication techniques, but at the expenses of utilizing extra additions [39].

5.3 Karatsuba Multiplication
In contrast to traditional multiplication, KA requires more RAM to execute, but decreases
execution times by decomposing each input polynomial into several smaller polynomials.
Weimerskirch et al [39], demonstrates the steps required to multiply two, one
degree, polynomials based on KA as follows given polynomials f(x) and g(x) in one pass:
f ( x) = f 0 + f1 x ,

g ( x) = g 0 + g1 x

Components of polynomials f(x) and g(x) are extracted and stored in three intermediate
variables, fg0, fg1 and rfg as follows:
fg 0 = f 0 g 0 ,

fg1 = f1 g1 ,
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r fg = ( f 0 + f1 )( g 0 + g1 )

The resulting product of h(x) = f(x)g(x) is performed as follows:
h( x) = fg 1 ( x 2 ) + (r fg − fg 0 − fg1 ) x + fg 0

In comparison to traditional multiplication, which requires n2 = 22 = 4 multiplications and
(n – 1)2 = (2 – 1)2 = 1 additions, the KA method requires 4 additions and 3
multiplications. KA therefore saves 1 multiplication, but required 3 additional additions
[39].

5.4 Recursive Karatsuba (KM)
Polynomial multiplication using KA for only one iteration, as seen above, can be
extended to incorporate recursion. The recursive KA method, referred to as KM in this
thesis, is nothing more than ‘splitting’ the polynomials f(x) and g(x) into two halves and
applying the aforementioned one-pass KA algorithm repeatedly until the polynomial size,
n, is equal to 1.
The technique to apply KM for multiplying any two, even, n-size polynomials
was modified slightly to accommodate odd values of n as suggested by Silverman [43].
The major change involved using the smaller of the two polynomial sizes after the split
rather than just n/2. Application of KM is outlines in Algorithm 5.2.
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Algorithm 5.2: KM_STAR(F(x), G(x), H(x), n, c, cutOff)

Input: F(x) – First polynomial
G(x) – Second polynomial
H(x) – Product of F(x) and G(x) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
n – Size of polynomials
c – Modulo value to apply to coefficients
cutOff – Minimum value of n for KM to execute
Output: H(x) = F(x) ⊗ G(x) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / xn – 1
Init: ls = n / 2, hs = n – ls, count = 0,
1: count = count + 1
2: If ( n = 1 )
{
If ( F(0) = 0 OR G(0) = 0 )
3a:
Return 0;
Else
3b:
Return H(x) = Mod( F(x)*G(x), c) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
}
4: If ( n < cutOff )
5:
Star_Multiply(F(x), G(x), H(x), n, c)
6: FL = F0x0 … Flsxls
7: FH = Fls+1xls+1 … Fhsxhs
8: GL = G0x0 … Glsxls
9: GH = Gls+1xls+1 … Ghsxhs
10: FGL = FLGL = KM_STAR(FL, GL, FGL, ls, c)
11: FGH = FHGH = KM_STAR(FH, GH, FGH, ls, c)
12: Rfg = (FL + FH)(GL + GH)
= KM_STAR((FL + FH), (GL + GH), Rfg, hs, c) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
13: H(x) = Mod( (FGH(x2ls) + (Rfg – FGL – FGH)(xls) + FGL)) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)

Slight changes to the recursive version of KM presented by Weimerskirch et al [39]
included constraining polynomials f(x) and g(x) to the ring, R, of truncated polynomials
in steps 3b, 5, 12, and 13 or whenever multiplication of polynomials occurred. Also, a
coefficient reduction modulo c is performed for any operation on a coefficient.
Given: f(x) = -1 – x, g(x) = -1 – x, n = 2, c = 3, threshold = 1
Find: h(x) = f(x)g(x) (mod c) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) using KM
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Init: ls = n / 2 = 2 / 2 = 1,
hs = n – ls = 2 – 1 = 1
6: FL = -1
7: FH = -1
8: GL = -1
9: GH = -1
10: FGL = FLGL = (-1)(-1) = 1 (mod 3)
11: FGH = FHGH = (-1)(-1) = 1 (mod 3)
12: Rfg = (FL + FH)(GL + GH)
= (-1 – 1)(-1 – 1)
= 4 (mod 3) = 1 (mod 3)
13: H(x) = (FGH(x2ls) + (Rfg – FGL – FGH)(xls) + FGL)
= (1(x2) + (1 – 1 – 1)(x1) + 1) (mod 3)
= x2 – x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
= x2-n + 2x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
= x2-2 + 2x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
= 1 +2x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
= 2 + 2x (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
16: H(x) = (2 +2x)(mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1)
Figure 5.1: KM Example

5.5 KM Performance
KM splits the input polynomial into two segments for each iteration of the algorithm.
Figure 5.2 details the polynomial sizes (N) for each iteration for an initial N = 107. For
Iteration 1 of KM, the original N = 107 is divided into two smaller polynomials of N = 53
and N = 54. Each iteration of the KM ‘splits’ the previous N in half, thereby forming a
binary tree. As the binary tree grows, the number of polynomials increases while their
respective N-size decreases until each branch of the tree is reduced to an N = 1 as shown
in Step 2 of Algorithm 5.2. Depending on the initial N-size, the ‘splitting’ involved in
KM quickly composes a large binary tree requiring significant memory.
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[1] N=107
Iteration 1
[2] N=53

N=54
Iteration 2

[4] N=27

N=27
Iteration 3

[8] N=13

N=14
Iteration 4

[16]

N=7

N=7
Iteration 5

[32]

N=3

N=4
Iteration 6

[64]

N=2

N=2
Iteration 7

[86] = 2(107 – 64)

N=1

N=1

Figure 5.2: KM polynomial Count [] and Size (N) for each iteration for N=107

Benchmarking of KM relative to traditional multiplication was performed on a MICAz
mote [25] with nesC [28] implementations of both.

The test was composed of

performing convolution, within ring R, two polynomials, f(x) and g(x), with coefficients
equal to ‘+1’ and a N-size equal to 107. The initial tests using polynomials f(x) and g(x)
showed KM to have poorer performance in terms of longer execution times than
traditional multiplication. Driessen et al also noticed this performance decrease and
attributed the drop in performance to the overhead of the recursion having to build
another function stack [15].

To understand the affects of stack maintenance on

performance for KM, the value of ‘CutOff’ , as shown in Step 4 of Algorithm 5.2, was
modified. The ‘Cutoff’ variable determines whether to continue the recursive calls to
KM or to switch over to using the star multiply Algorithm 5.1. A ‘Cutoff’ value larger
than the initial input polynomials N-size will disable KM and always execute the star
multiplication, Algorithm 5.1. Selecting a ‘Cutoff’ equal to ‘1’ will have the opposite
effect, thereby always calling the KM, Algorithm 5.2, and never executing the Algorithm
5.1. Selecting an intermediate ‘CutOff’ value will utilize both Algorithms 5.1 and 5.2.
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To demonstrate the effect the ‘CutOff’ value has on execution time, Table 5.1
summarizes the execution time required to perform the convolution of f(x) and g(x)
within ring R for N = 107.
CutOff Value

Number of Iterations

Execution Time (ms)

108

0

622

55

1

543

28

2

452

15

3

398

8

4

385

5

5

441

3

6

576

1

7

727

Table 5.1: KM execution time versus CutOff value
As previously mentioned, the first entry executes star multiplication, Algorithm 5.1, since
the ‘CutOff’ value is larger than the polynomial N-size of 107. Utilizing Algorithm 5.1
exclusively resulted in a 622ms execution time. Decreasing the ‘CutOff’ value below the
input polynomial N-size starts to enable the recursive iterations of the KM. Selecting a
‘CutOff’ value equal to 1 disables all Algorithm 5.1 executions and relies on complete
KM usage. Since recursion is being executed for every N-size polynomial in KM, the
overhead of stack maintenance results in the worst performance time of 727ms. With a
careful selection of a ‘CutOff’ value, equal to 8, between the two aforementioned
extremes, an overall improved execution time of 385ms was obtained using only 4 out of
a possible 7 iterations of KM. Any further decrease in the ‘CutOff’ value increases
execution time due to the excessive stack overhead involved in recursion.

5.6 Private Key Polynomial fp
During the key generation phase in Section 4.3, polynomial f was randomly generated
until the following properties of the polynomial were met [45]:
- f is invertible mod p
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- f is invertible mod q
While the random generation of f is fairly quick, performing the AIA (Algorithm 4.3) is
very time consuming, especially if an inverse for f is not found and the AIA needs to
execute again. An optimization used in the commercial release of NTRUEncrypt that
eliminates the need to find the inverse polynomial fp utilizes the following property of f
[45]:
f = 1+ p * F

(22)

Since the AIA success criteria for a polynomial to be invertible is f(0) = ± 1 (mod p), as
shown in step 6b, one option is to generate a random polynomial F, star multiply by p and
add 1. The star multiplication of F and p ensures a modulo reduction of p exists along
with satisfying the f(0) = ± 1 (mod p) criteria of the AIA. Generating a known invertible
polynomial f benefits the NTRU algorithm in two regards:
-

Polynomial f is guaranteed to be invertible mod p and therefore eliminates
the AIA check for inverse.

-

The second polynomial star multiplication of fp and a in the decryption
formula (20) is no longer required, thereby reducing the decryption
execution time.

Algorithm 5.3 was used to generate a guaranteed invertible fp
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Algorithm 5.3: CreateInvertible(f(x), g(x), n, m)

Input:

f(x) – Polynomial to invert
n – Size of polynomials a(x) and b(x)
m – Modulo value to apply to coefficients

Output: g(x) – Invertible polynomial
1: g(x) = f(x)
2: for ( i = 0 to n )
{
3:
g(x) = g(x) * m
}
4: g(0) = Mod( g(0) + 1, m )

6 Evaluation and Performance
The intent of this thesis was to perform a like-for-like comparison of NTRUEncrypt
against ECIES. To ensure the comparison would be as fair as possible, a version of each
cryptosystem was chosen that had equivalent symmetric bit security levels. The work by
Kouzmenko concluded that NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECC-163 both have an equivalent
asymmetric security level of 80-bits [35]. Since the NTRUEncrypt-251 was based on a
prime field, the prime field based ECIES-160 was chosen over the equivalent security
level, non-prime field based, ECIES-163 [38].

6.1 Hardware
The MICAz mote, from Crossbow Technologies [25] in Figure 6.1, was used in the
characterization

and

benchmarking

of

ECIES-160

versus

NTRUEncrypt-251.

Programming and PC communication with the mote utilizes the MIB520 USB Gateway
in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.1:Crossbow MICAz

Figure 6.2: Crossbow MIB520 Gateway
The MICAz is an Atmel based 8-bit ATMega128L microcontroller [36] that contains a
2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver and 4KB of RAM. A listing of the
main specifications of the MICAz mote is summarized in Table 6.1.
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Processor Performance

MPR2400CA (ATmega128L)

Clock

0 – 8 MHz

Program Flash Memory

128K bytes

Measurement (Serial) Flash

512K bytes

Configuration EEPROM

4K bytes

Current Draw

8mA – Active Mode
< 15 µA – Sleep Mode

RF Transceiver

Transmit Data Rate

250kbs

Frequency Band

2400 MHz to 2483.5 MHz

Outdoor Range

75m – 100m

Indoor Range

10m – 30m

Current Draw

19.7mA – Receive Mode
17.4mA – Transmit, 0dBm

Electromechanical

Battery

2X AA Batteries

External Power

2.7V – 3.3V

Table 6.1: MICAz (MPR2400CA) Hardware Specification
The MICAz mote contains expansions connectors that allow auxiliary inputs to be
acquired such as light, temperature and acceleration, though for this thesis the base
MICAz mote is the only required hardware.

6.2 Software
The MICAz motes run on TinyOS, which is open source operating system specifically
designed for embedded sensor network devices [27]. It features various component
libraries that include sensor drivers along with network protocols. Since TinyOS is open
source, it is very easy to extend the base functionality of the pre-distributed drivers to suit
the unique needs of the developer.
The MoteWorks version 2.0.F [51] of TinyOS 1.x was used exclusively through
this thesis as the primary operating system for the MICAz. Though any version of
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TinyOS 1.x would have sufficed, the MoteWork’s released included the custom nesC
header file, SOdebug.h, which provided a very nice interface to output code debug
information to the PC using the MICAz’s USB port. Without this powerful interface,
debugging of the code in TinyOS 1.x would have been significantly more difficult.
The now deprecated TinyOS 1.x version was used instead of the latest TinyOS
2.1 version because the only operating system TinyECC supports is TinyOS 1.x. The use
of TinyOS 2.1 would have eliminated the need for the MoteWorks version since TinyOS
2.1 includes improved interfaces for debugging code via the USB serial port.

6.3 Test Setup
A standard PC with an USB port was used to program and collect data from the MICAz
mote. TinyOS version 1.1, supplied within the MoteWorks release, was installed on the
PC and used in the nesC code development of NTRUEncrypt and collection of timing
data for ECIES.

6.4 ECIES-160 Results
TinyECC [26] is a publically available software package that operates on TinyOS [27]
and provides an ECC based public key cryptosystem for WSNs.

It contains full

implementations of the following ECC schemes:
-

ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement

-

ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

-

ECIES – Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme

ECIES was chosen as the ECC version to compare NTRUEncrypt throughout this thesis
for its basic properties of encryption and decryption. ECIES differs from ECDSA in that
ECDSA only provides signature generation and verification without an encryption of the
message and would be better suited to compare against NTRUSign [36].
There are a number of optimization switches for ECIES that can be enabled at
compilation time that will reduce execution times for initialization, encryption and
decryption. To provide a fair comparison of execution times for the various operations
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between ECIES and NTRUEncrypt, all optimization switches were enabled which
provided “the most computationally efficient configuration” [17]. A full listing of the
switches along with details of each setting can be found in the TinyECC paper [17].
The TinyECC implementation of ECIES-160 by Liu et al [26], using the
recommended elliptic curve domain parameters specified in secp160r1 [10], was
compiled and install on a MICAz mote in an effort to recreate and compare execution
times. With all optimizations enabled and the results average over 10 iterations, Figure
6.3 shows the actual results obtained after compiling and executing the ‘testECIESM.nc’
file released under TinyECC.

Figure 6.3: Actual ECIES-160 Execution Times
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Table 6.2 summarizing the results obtained in this thesis along with those observed by
Liu et al [17].
ECIES Operation

Liu et al (ms)

This Work (ms)

Initialization

1834.74

1838.74

Encryption

3907.34

3907.49

Decryption

2632.66

2632.59

Table 6.2 Liu et al vs. my work timing results for ECIES-160
The Initialization time for ECIES includes the time required to setup the Barrett
Reduction and Sliding Window optimizations used in ECIES. Barrett Reduction is an
alternative method for performing modulo reduction by using pre-computed modulo
reciprocals along with multiplication operations instead of division [52]. The Sliding
Window optimization speeds up scalar multiplications by storing pre-computed product
combinations with a window width of w bits [17]. By performing the multiplication and
storing the product ahead of time for a window width w, only one addition operation
every w bits is needed for a scalar multiplication.
The output in Figure 6.3 shows initialization, public key generation, encryption
and decryption times, but does not show the execution time for the private key. To
understand the amount of time required to generate the private key in ECIES-160, the
TinyECC code for the ECIESM.nc and show_ecies.java classes were modified to output
the private key generation time as shown in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Actual ECIES-160 Execution Times Including Private Key Generation
The results indicate a negligible amount of time is required to compute the private
key in ECIES, i.e. 0.2ms, as shown as ‘private key gen’ in Figure 6.4 The time is small
since it involves only selecting a random integer within the order of the base point for the
elliptic curve as detailed in section 3.1.1.
The recreation of Liu et al’s results provides confidence that the timing results
obtained from this thesis’s NTRUEncrypt implementation will be comparable to that of
the ECIES-160 TinyECC version.

6.5 NTRUEncrypt-251 Implementation and Results
NTRUEncrypt’s security is based on the values selected for parameters N, p and q. The
initial suggested values from both NTRU.com [31] and CEES [49] are shown in Table
6.3.
Security Level N

p

Q

df

dg

dr

Low

107

3

64

15

12

5

Moderate

167

3

128

61

20

18

Standard

251

3

128

72

72

72

Table 6.3: NTRUEncrypt parameter selection based on security
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As years have passed, recent attacks such as meet-in-the-middle (MITM) and lattice
reduction [21] against NTRUEncrypt have revealed short falls in the original parameter
sets in Table 6.3. As a result, newly suggested parameters recently, release in 2009,
indicate the selection of yet larger values of N, p and q. For comparison purposes,
Hirschhorn et al now suggests for 112-bit security with a compromise between speed and
code space, that N = 541, p = 3 and q = 2048 [21]. These values will continue to be
assumed stable until the next successful attack proves them ineffective.
The complete implementation of NTRUEncrypt-251 was written in nesC utilizing
all of the pseudo-code algorithms mentioned in the previous sections. When applicable,
the code utilized 1-byte, or 8-bit, sized registers to minimize memory usage. This
constraint limits the register to a signed size ranging from -127 to +127. Therefore, the
NTRUEncrypt-251 requirement of modulo q = 128 reduction of coefficients was not
possible. In order to store polynomial coefficients that can be reduced by q = 128, the
storage size for coefficients in the microprocessor code were increased to 2-bytes, or 16bits.

Since the MICAz mote contains 4kB of 8-bit data registers, increasing the

coefficient storage size to 16-bits doubled the required amount of RAM.

Even with

techniques such as using globally defined arrays and maximizing the reuse of these
arrays, the MICAz mote failed to provide enough RAM to implement the complete
NTRUEncrypt-251 cryptosystem. The only way to successfully execute NTRUEncrypt251 on the MICAz mote was to reduce the value of q to 64, and used polynomial arrays
with 8-bit coefficients.
Even with the reduced coefficient widths, the collection of timing data from
NTRUEncrypt-251 implementation proved to be challenge.

The first attempt executed

the complete cryptosystem with the Karatsuba and f = 1 + p ⊗ F optimizations disabled.
This resulted in the MICAz continuously crashing due to lack of memory. The only
option remaining was to enable the f = 1 + p ⊗ F substitution, since enabling Karatsuba
would definitely require more memory. The f = 1 + p ⊗ F substitution eliminated the
need to store the inverse fp array, thereby reducing the required RAM by 251 bytes. This
small reduction in memory was just enough to capture timing for a 10 round average of
the complete cryptosystem as shown in Figure 6.5 and summarized in Table 6.4.
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Figure 6.5: NTRUEncrypt-251 Average Exec Time for 10 Rounds with CutOff = 252
Due to the selection of q = 64, instead of q = 128, decryption failures occurred as
indicated by the fact decrypted message c does not equal the original plaintext message
mx in Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.5 also shows that it took 16 total attempts of finding

polynomial inverses for fq to obtain 10 successful inverses to complete an end-to-end
execution of the NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem.
Encryption
NTRUEncrypt-251
Operation

e Name
Variable

1845
Execution
Time (ms)

c

2229
23546

Private Key Generation

f

51

Temp Key Generation

f2

6027

Secret Key Generation

fq

17468

Decryption
Initialization

Encryption Total

3895

Secret Polynomial Generation

g

52

Blinding Polynomial Generation

r

51

Public Key Generation

h

1947

54

Table 6.4: NTRUEncrypt-251 Execution Times
The three highlighted rows were created for comparison to the categories of the ECIES160 output in the previous section 6.4.

The execution times for the categories of

Initialization and Encryption Total is the sum total of the execution times of the indented
rows below each category. Since the total encryption time for ECIES-160, shown in
Table 6.2, includes the public key generation time, the category labeled ‘Encryption
Total’ in Table 6.4 displays the total time for all steps of the encryption for
NTRUEncrypt-251.
Attempts to improve the above executions times by enabling just one round of
Karatsuba caused the MICAz to continuously reset due to insufficient RAM.

6.6 NTRUEncyrpt-251 vs. ECIES-160
Figure 6.6 compares the execution times for all stages of NTRUEncrypt-251 versus
ECIES-160.

NTRUEncrypt-251 vs. ECIES-160
29000
25000

23546

Time (ms)

21000
17000

ECIES-160

13000

NTRUEncrypt-251

9000
5000

3907 3895

2632 2202

1839

1000
Initialization

Encryption

Decryption

Operation

Figure 6.6: NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 Execution Times

55

The Initialization times between the two cryptosystems revealed NTRUEncrypt-251 took
approximately 13 times longer to initialize relative to ECIES-160, though the Encryption
and Decryption times of the two cryptosystem were very comparable.

6.7 NTRUEncyrpt-107
Given the poor performance of NTRUEncrypt-251 on the MICAz mote, the ‘low’
security version of NTRUEncrypt, specified in Table 6.3, was evaluated to understand
the effects Karatsuba would have on the overall execution time. Since NTRUEncrypt107 requires less than half of the memory of NTRUEncrypt-251, execution times with all
optimizations enabled were easily collected without any memory constraint issues.
Figure 6.8 summarizes the various executions times at selected Karatsuba cutoff values
with Figure 6.7 showing the details for the fastest execution time when CutOff = 28.

Figure 6.7: NTRUEncrypt-107 Average Exec Times for 10 Rounds with CutOff = 28
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NTRUEncrypt-107 (Zero Check On Multiply Enabled)
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Figure 6.8: NTRUEncrypt-107 Execution Times with Zero Check Enabled.
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The execution times for Encryption, Decryption and Public Key generation actually
increase as more iterations of Karatsuba were introduced, while Initialization times
decrease. The reason this occurs is due to less usage of the ‘zero check’ optimization
within the Star Multiplication, Algorithm 5.1, as CutOff values are decreased. This very
simple check for multiplication of zero coefficients is actually quicker than utilizing the
Karatsuba method that does not include the check. Figure 6.9 shows the results for the
execution times when the Zero Check was disabled for increasing levels of Karatsuba.
The overall time for every cutoff value was worse than when the zero check enabled.
The fastest execution time was 3921ms with Karatsuba (CutOff = 28) and the zero check
in Star Multiply enabled compared to 5847ms with Karatsuba (CutOff = 8) and zero
check disabled. This simple optimization of checking for zeros saved 1926ms overall.
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Figure 6.9: NTRUEncrypt-107 Execution Times with Zero Check Disabled.
Given additional memory on the MICAz, Karatsuba would have reduced the overall
execution time for NTRUEncrypt-251 based on the execution time improvements
Karatsuba provide NTRUEncrypt-107.
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6.8 Energy Consumption
6.8.1 Microprocessor Power Consumption
The energy calculation equation presented in Liu et al [17] was used to calculate the
power consumption used by the MICAz for each cryptosystem.
W=UxIxt

(21)

Where:
W – Power in millijoules (mJ)
U – Voltage in volts (v)
I – Current in milliamps (ma)
t – Time in milliseconds (ms)
Per the Crossbow data sheet for the MICAz mote, the current draw I = 8ma, at a voltage
U = 3v [25]. An example calculation using the encryption time for ECIES-160 being
3907.49 ms, the amount of energy required to execute is:
W=UxIxt
W = 3v x 8ma x 3907.4ms
W = 93.8 mJ
The amount of power required to execute NTRUEncrypt-251 versus ECIES-160 at
various stages of the algorithms is shown in Table 6.5.
Operation

Initialization

ECIES-160 Power
Consumption (mJ)
44.1

NTRUEncrypt-251 Power
Consumption (mJ)
576.1

Encryption

93.8

93.5

Decryption

63.2

53.5

Table 6.5: Power Consumption for ECIES-160 and NTRUEncrypt-251
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6.8.2 Transmit and Receive Power
Power calculations for the transmission and receipt of data, is based on the total number
of data bits and the power required by the antenna to transmit a single bit. Power
consumption of the ZigBee transceiver, CC2420, integrated into the MICAz mote
consumes the following power to transmit and receive [9]:
Transmit Power @0dBm = 0.209 µJ/bit
Receive Power = 0.226 µJ/bit
The number of bits used in transmission and receiving, for each cryptosystem, are
determined by their respective public key sizes in Table 6.6.
Cryptosystem

Calculation

Public Key Size
(bits)

NTRUEncrypt-251

N*log2(q) = 251* log2(128)

1757

ECIES-160

Num Public Keys * Size of Public Key

320

(bits) = 2*160
Table 6.6: Public Key Size for NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160
Multiplication of the public key size by the power to transmit and receive one bit
produces the transceiver power required to exchange a message on the MICAz mote as
shown in Table 6.7.
Cryptosystem

Operation Power (µJ)
Transmit

Receive

NTRUEncrypt-251

1757*0.209 = 367.21

1757*0.226 = 397.08

ECIES-160

320*0.209 = 66.88

320*0.226 = 72.32

Table 6.7: Transmit and Receive Power Based on Cryptosystem
Since the power to transmit and receive is based on the number of bits in the public key,
ECIES-160 requires less power than NTRUEncrypt-251.
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Overall the execution time required by the cryptosystem to prepare the data to be
transmitted requires a magnitude of 3 times more power than to transmit and receive the
data. Optimization techniques that reduce the amount of execution time required by the
processor will have the most impact on battery life.

6.9 Code Size
Calculation of the nesC code size for ECIES-160 and NTRUEncrypt-251 utilized the
‘check_size_micaz.pl’ PERL [4] script, under the TinyOS distribution, to obtain RAM
and ROM sizes [17]. The script displays the code’s RAM and ROM size for each class
referenced in the final binary executable file. Executing the script on the ECIES-160 and
NTRUEncrypt-251 code obtained the outputs shown in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11
respectively.
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Figure 6.10: ECIES-160 Code Size
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Figure 6.11: NTRUEncrypt-251 Code Size
The script isolates each individual class and displays that class’s code size (ROM) and
bss (RAM) sizes in two columns. The ROM calculation is the amount of program flash
memory required to store the program code, including the initial values of global
variables, within the MICAz’s max limit of 128KB of ROM. The RAM calculation, also
known as data, contains the size for constants and initialized static data. Combining the
values of each row for each column produces the ‘Totals’ value in the last line of Figure
6.10 and Figure 6.11. To obtain code sizes for each cryptosystem, only the entries related
to the actual cryptosystem code are combined where as the other entries for the MICAz’s
operating system are ignored. The NTRUEncrypt-251 was written in one nesC file, so
the only entry needed from Figure 6.11 for the ROM and RAM sizes is the ‘NtruC’ entry.
Code size for the ECIES-160 implementation uses many nesC classes, all of which need
to be added together. Adding the ROM and RAM sizes together for ECCM, ECIESM,
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NNM, RandomLFSR, SHA1M, testECIESM and secp160r1 produced the ROM and
RAM sizes for ECIES-160 in Table 6.8.
Cryptosystem

ROM (bytes)

RAM (bytes)

NTRUEncrypt-251

2214

0

ECIES-160

18136

2156

Table 6.8: NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 ROM and RAM Sizes
The memory sizes published by Liu et al [17] were 19308 bytes for ROM and 1510 bytes
for RAM. The memory size differences between Liu et al [17] and this thesis’s work
may be related to different classes being chosen in the total memory size calculations.
The RAM size of ‘0’ in the NTRUEncrypt calculation indicates no constants or
static data were used in the implementation. Overall, NTRUEncrypt-251 occupies less
ROM and RAM than ECIES-160.

7 Conclusion and Future Work
The work presented in this thesis provided the design, implementation and evaluation of
NTRUEncrypt on a resource constrained device. An overview of ECC provided a high
level understanding of the PKCS. Performance characteristic including execution time,
power consumption and code size for both NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 were
evaluated. The performance impacts of several optimizations to NTRUEncrypt were
presented along with there tradeoffs.
Though NTRUEncrypt-251 was not able to outperform ECIES-160 due to system
resource constraints, results suggest better performance of NTRUEncrypt-251 may be
obtainable if more memory was available.
Opportunities exist that can significantly improve the performance of
NTRUEncrypt on resource constrained devices. This thesis proved that Karatsuba can
provide significant reductions in the overall execution time of the NTRUEncrypt,
especially in the calculation of polynomial inverses. This thesis was unable to provide an
optimized NTRUEncrypt-251 implement that could outperform ECIES-160 due to the
4kB memory constraint of the MICAz mote.

Given several kB more memory,

NTRUEncrypt-251 has the potential to outperform ECIES-160.
64

Future work of implementing NTRUEncrypt-251 on a Crossbow TelosB mote,
which contains 10kB of RAM, should allow the enablement of optimizations that may
bring NTRUEncrypt-251 performance equal to or better than ECIES-160.
The addition of a ‘Zero Check’ in the Karatsuba algorithm may enhance overall
execution time of NTRUEncrypt similar to the results of the ‘Zero Check’ in the Star
Multiply algorithm.
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